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Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty
Date:

May 26th, 2015

(deviating time & place!)

Place:

20.14, R 216

Speaker:

Jiehua Chen (TU Berlin)

Time:

5:30 pm

Source:

Abstract:
We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.