Social Choice Theory
The seminar adresses topics of preference and judgement aggregation, based on general results in Social Choice Theory such as Arrow's famous impossibility theorem and Gibbard's oligarchy theorem. Possible topics also include problems in voting theory, for example problems arising from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite-Theorem.
The seminar resumes the topics treated in the course "Social Choice Theory" held by Prof. Puppe in the summer term and gives the opportunity to further examine these topics. Basic knowledge of microeconomics is required, basic knowledge of Social Choice Theory is recommended, but not absolutely necessary.
The seminar will be held as a block seminar and will take place on two days in January/February 2015. The dates and the topics of the seminar papers will be specified and distributed in a preliminary meeting. Suggestions on topics for your paper are welcome. Each participant will write a paper of ca. 15 pages and will hold a presentation of ca. 30 minutes. The papers are to be handed in two weeks after the presentations have taken place. An outline of the paper is to be handed in in advance.
Our first meeting will take place at the beginning of the semester, the date will be announced here.
Please direct queries to Tobias Dittrich (firstname.lastname@example.org).