Chair of Economic Theory

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

  • Date:

    May 26th, 2015

    (deviating time & place!)

  • Speaker:

    Jiehua Chen (TU Berlin)

  • Time:

    5:30 pm

  • Source:

    Abstract:
    We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.

  • Place:

    20.14, R 216