None.

Recommendations:

Basic knowledge of mathematics and statistics is assumed.

Compulsory textbook:

Gibbons (1992): A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

Additional Literature:

Berninghaus/Ehrhart/Güth (2010): Strategische Spiele, Springer Verlag.

Binmore (1991): Fun and Games, DC Heath.

Fudenberg/Tirole (1991): Game Theory, MIT Press.

Heifetz (2012): Game Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press.

The course focusses on non-cooperative game theory. It discusses models, solution concepts, and applications for simultaneous games as well as sequential games. Various solution concepts, e.g., Nash equilibrium and subgame-perfect equilibrium, are introduced along with more advanced concepts. A short introduction to cooperative game theory is given if there is sufficient time.

The total workload for this course is approximately 135.0 hours. For further information see German version.

This course offers an introduction to the theoretical analysis of strategic interaction situations. At the end of the course, students shall be able to analyze situations of strategic interaction systematically and to use game theory to predict outcomes and give advice in applied economics settings.

The assessment consists of a written exam (60 minutes) according to Section 4(2),1 of the examination regulation.

The exam takes place in the recess period and can be resited at every ordinary examination date.